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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The paper tries to give some insights on the economic reasons that can entail
a blackout, and, as a consequence, on the extent to which there is room for a
regualator in the sector.
A variety of countries have recently been hit by a blackout, including the
United States and Italy.
If it is true that a large fraction of the blackout-related studies are performed
by engineers, it is also true that there is some economics involved.
This works focuses on one economic aspect of the blackout that I think is
relevant and worth analyzing.
One of the real problems that the energy industry faces is uncertainty over
d e m a n d .I tc a ns h o wu pi nt w ow a y s .A tﬁrst, energy is a just-in-time industry,
in which the product is released under consumers’ request. With respect to
other just-in-time products, however, the energy market has a diﬀerence that,
in my view, bears signiﬁcant economic implications. That is, the energy is to be
delivered promptly, contextually to the time consumer requires it. Demand for
energy ﬂuctuates at every moment, and every ﬁrm has to sustain positive costs,
such as keeping multiple energy plants ready to produce, in order to make sure
to fulﬁl the whole demand. Another problem is uncertainty over demand in the
long run. However, long run uncertainty over demand is a common problem
that many ﬁrms face, and that does not require a speciﬁca n a l y s i s .
Therefore, the present paper is centered on the speciﬁci s s u ew i he n e r g y
ﬁrms, that is the impossibility of forecasting the demand in the short run, and
the consequent trade-oﬀ between sure fulﬁllment of the whole demand, with
likely dispersion of valuable resources, and chance of not serving the totality of
consumers, being it less likely to waste resources.
The model is supposed to capture this short run uncertainty. It is supposed
to do it in a stylized way, assuming a discrete lenght period, uncertainty over
the demand, and decision on the quantity produced - and as a consequence of
the cost paid by the ﬁrm - before the demand is revealed.
1As a ﬁrst approximation, each ﬁrm in an area is a monopolist, which can be
justiﬁe db yt h ep r e s e n c eo fh u g eﬁxed costs in connecting users to the network.
The option for local monopolists to buy a fraction of their supply from other
producers is available, and will be considered in what follows.
To synthetize, the paper examines the three following issues connected to
the energy market:
1. Uncertainty ex ante over demand, and the consequent choice of risking to
either overproduce, or to underserve the market.
2. Capacity constraints for the energy ﬁrms, with the consequence that pro-
duction is shared by a number of plants.
3. High ﬁxed costs of setting up the distribution procedure, which make it
likely to have regional monopolies in the retail market.
The questions that the paper tries to answer are the following:
1) Will the energy ﬁrms be willing to connect in order to avoid blackouts?
The answer in the paper is yes, but we did not consider the ﬁxed cost of estab-
lishing the connection, very important indeed
2) What is the optimal structure of the market, i.e., what would the outcome
of an unregulated process be? Would this outcome avoid blackouts?
I believe the questions are important, as the energy market is subject to a
lot of regulations that ASSUME to be inspired to a competitive outcome. But
the question is: are we sure the competitive outcome regulators inspire to is the
true competitive outcome?
And more, are we sure that the true competitive outcome wouldn’t be welfare
enhancing also for consumers with respect to the regulation outcome?
The model is by now far too complicated to answer these questions satisfac-
torily. I hope I’ll manga to simplify it.
2 The model
2.1 Version A: the basic framework, static and without
interconnection
The most basic setup has the following assumptions:
1. The market is monopolistic, and the same ﬁrm is produces and distributing
the good.
2. All consumers attribute an identical value ν to the product, when they
need it, whereas their value is 0 when they do not need the product.
3. The consumers are a represented by a set of measure one. Only a fraction
of them needs the good in a given period. The demand q is uncertain
2at the time in which the monopolist takes the production decision. That
implies that the ﬁrm is paying the cost for the units it decides to produce,
regardless of whether or not it will actually sell them.
4. The marginal cost for each produced unit is c
5. The environment is static. Equivalently, with a dynamic environment,
consumers’ behavior in the dynamic environment does not depend on the
production decisions of the ﬁrm in the previous periods. In other words,
no punishment is put in place by consumers when they are not served.
6. v>c>0.v>cbasically guarantees the existence of the ﬁrm, that
otherwise wouldn’t even be willing to produce. c>0 guarantees that the
problem is not trivial. Indeed if c =0 , ﬁrms would always decide to serve
the whole market, whatever the dimension of the market turns out to be.
7. The environment is static, i.e., ﬁrms make a one-period decision regarding
their production level.
Example 1 I start with an example that I think is useful to clarify the problem.
It concerns the solution of the problem when the demand is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. Denote q∗ the quantity produced and q the quantity demanded.
The ﬁrm then faces the following problem:
max









q∗ +( vq∗ − cq∗)(1− q∗)




− 2cq∗ + v
q∗
2
− [vq∗ − cq∗ +( −v + c)(1− q∗)] ⇔− vq∗ + v − c
The second order condition yields:
−v<0
The problem is concave. Therefore, the solution to the ﬁrst order condition
yields the optimal point:
vq∗ = v − c ⇔ q∗ =
v − c
v
Given the assumptions on v, c, the quantity is always positive. A bit of simple












3As intuitively plausible, the quantity produced decreases with the marginal cost,
while it increases with the value for consumers.




































The next step is to try and generalize a bit the result, not assuming any
speciﬁc form for the utility function.
The result, albeit obvious, is worth to be stated and proved.
Proposition 2 When a monopolist faces uncertainty over demand, his produc-
tion decision is strictly increasing with the value of the product to the consumer,
if we assume homogeneity of all consumers except for the decision of whether
or not to buy, and strictly decreasing with its marginal production cost.
Proof. (to be completed) It follows form the fact that we are simply performing
a monotonic transformation.
The ﬁrm now solves an analogous problem with respect to the previous one:
max









f (q)dq =1− F (q∗)
E (q|q ≤ q∗)=
q∗ Z
qmin
q (f (q)|q ≤ q∗)dq =
q∗ Z
qmin








4It therefore follows that:
max
































⎠F (q∗)+( vq∗ − cq∗)=
At the optimum, we have:
















Now, we can proceed in two ways, either to prove that the ﬁrst order condition
is supermodular in q∗ and v, and also in q∗ and −c, which I have not been
able to do, or, on the other hand, to use the brute force approach, and totally
diﬀerentiate. The latter is the chosen.


















⎠ + F0 (q∗)(vq∗ (f (q∗|q ≤ q∗)) − 1)
⎤
⎥
⎦dq∗ − 1dc =0
The results are the following:
















⎠ + F0 (q∗)(vq∗ (f (q∗|q ≤ q∗)) − 1) =
dc
dq∗
The result is fairly simple and intuitive, and it tells us that in the presence
of uncertainty over demand, the ﬁrm will bear a positive probability of leaving
some potential consumers unserved.
This ﬁrst result can be signiﬁcant, as it may somehow illustrate the economic
dynamics of a blackout.
The next attempt is to make the problem dynamic, through the introduction
of multiple periods. I will here establish the framework, without actually solving
the problem.
It is clear that, as stated before, if consumers do not react to the monopolist’s
decisions, the string of decisions in a dynamic context is simply the replication
5of the one period decision, with the average per period payoﬀ for the ﬁrm that
approaches the expected per period proﬁt, invoking the the law of large numbers.
Something changes, on the other hand, if we assume that consumers are
reacting to the decisions of the monopolist. For example, we can say that if a
consumer is left unserved, i.e., if a blackout happens, he punishes the monopolist,
and stop being supplied by him. The consumer left unserved can, for example,
construct his own energy generation system, which, in spite of being more costly,
will guarantee him from any future blackout. Consumers are drastic, and the
monopolist has to react to this drastic form of punishment. The company has
indeed the option of blocking the supply of energy for a fraction of customers. In
this reduced form model, it is hard to establish whether the punishment by the
consumer is actually an equilibrium punishment. Therefore, I will just assume
so, and stick to the assumption throughout the paper.
2.2 Version B: dynamic aspects without interconnection
Besides assumptions 1 through 6, a set of additional assumptions has to be
made:
7b. Consumers do not know ex ante the ﬁrm’ cost, and ex ante they think they
will be served with reasonably high probability by the energy supplier
8. Ex post, consumers who are not served once stop buying from the supplier.
They construct their own system of energy generation, and operate it.
9. Demand is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 in the ﬁrst period, then
the upper bound of demand declines according to the above speciﬁed rule
in the following periods. In any period, demand is uniformly distributed
between 0 and its upper bound. This assumption has already been used
in example 1.
Assumption 7b, which replaces assumption 7, is purposedly capturing the
punishment that consumers give to the ﬁrm. In otder for the punishment to be
reasonable, it has to be an equilibrium punishment which cannot be checked in
the present framework, owing to the reduced form representation of consumers’
preferences. Future extensions, hopefully, will take care of that problem.
Denote γ as the measure of consumers that have always been served in the
previous periods, whenever they have requested the product. In other words,
γt represents the upper bound of the distribution of potential consumer in period
t
Proposition 3 A ﬁrm facing uncertainty over demand and the punishment rule
























































































The value of γ - representing the expected measure of consumers that the
ﬁrm never ’disappointed’, and thus the upper bound of the density of potential



































































































It is natural that the ﬁrm will have an incentive to update its production
at every period, after uncertainty over the demand in the previous period has
been resolved
The solution to the previous problem requires a huge computational burden,
and I am not sure if it is worth performing it by now. I followed the old rule ’in
dubio abstine’, and to be safe I did not do it!
A couple of interesting results can still be stated.
7Claim 4 As the discount factor approaches 0, the solution to the maximization
problem approaches the solution to the single period problem
Proof. .W h e n δ =0 , the ﬁrm does not value the future, and therefore
the dynamic problem converges to the static one-shot game. Intuitively, as the
value of the future for the ﬁrm disappears, the incentive to raise production with
respect to the one shot game in order to gain future proﬁts becomes weaker
Claim 5 As the discount factor approaches 1, the ﬁrm will serve the whole
market with probability one if in the single shot game the expected value of
proﬁts from producing 1 exceeds its cost, i.e., if v>2c
Proof. The ﬁrm is now facing an inﬁnite stream of equally valuable proﬁt.
Therefore, the beneﬁt of serving the whole market forever oﬀsets any other
ﬁnite-periods gain. The only point to check is whether this strategy entails a
positive average payoﬀ per period, that implies an inﬁnte payoﬀ in the dynamic




>c q ∗ ⇔ v>2c
Suppose v>2c, and the ﬁrm decides to leave some consumers unserved in the
ﬁrst period. Then, (1 − q∗) is positive. Suppose also (1 − q∗) is very small - a
conservative assumption. Then, the ﬁrm’s strategy entails a positive expected





On the other hand, the ﬁrm’s losses are given by the inﬁnite stream of losses.
Therefore, the deviation is not proﬁtable.
I will solve, however, a two period model, satisfying assumptions 1 through
6, and 7b through 9. The discount factor is assumed to be1.
Proposition 6 In a two periods model satisfying assumptions 1 through 9, in
which proﬁt si nt h et w op e r i o d sh a v ee q u a lw e i g h ti nt h eﬁrm’s decision, the
monopolist produces in the ﬁrst period a higher quantity than in the one-shot
game





















































































































At the optimum, we have
q∗
1 =
3v2 + c2 − 4cv
−2cv +3 v2 + c2,q ∗
2 =
−21v4c +2 0 c2v3 − 12c3v2 +5 vc4 +9 v5 − c5
v(−2cv +3 v2 + c2)
2




6v4 − 16v3c +1 5 c2v2 − 6c3v + c4
−2cv +3 v2 + c2
¾
It is easily possible to prove that the optimal quantity is positive for any values
satisfying our initial assumption, that v>c>0.To do that, it is suﬃcient
to just solve the following inequality and check that it holds for all values that
satisfy our assumptions.
3v2 + c2 − 4cv
−2cv +3 v2 + c2 > 0
Also, it is possible to show that 0 <q ∗
1 < 1.
Now, we compare q∗
1 in the two cases, i.e., when the monopolist has a 1
period horizon, and when it has a two period horizon. In order to do that, we
normalize the cost to 1, in order to have the results more easily understandable.
q∗
1 two period >q ∗
1 one period ⇐⇒
3v2 + c2 − 4cv
−2cv +3 v2 + c2 >
v − 1
v
⇐⇒ (given that c =1 )
3v2 +1− 4v





The inequality always holds.
9Once more, the result is intuitively plausible; if the ﬁrm produces in two
periods, its production in the ﬁrst period will be higher, due to the threat of
consumers not buying from he ﬁrm in the next period.
Essentially, the presence of multiple periods enhances the consumer welfare,
in the sense that a greater production is carried out with respect to the static
game. No meaningful comparison can be performed on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, since
in this last case, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is spread across multiple periods. The ﬁrst
periodproﬁtf o rt h eﬁrm, however, is lower under this circumstance than in the
basic one.
2.3 Version C: static game with interconnection
Consider now an alternative situation, in which the regional monopolist can buy
some energy from another ﬁrm, with respect to which the monopolist is a price-
taker. There is no limit to the quantity the other ﬁrm oﬀers, so the monopolist
can always choose ex post to buy from its supplier, of which he knows the price
ex ante. This is a ﬁrst simpliﬁed form of interconnection between ﬁrms, just to
get introduced to the -maybe- more interesting next scenarios.
Formally, the new assumptions are:
10. In order to satisfy its demand, the monopolist can buy an unlimited
amount of energy from a supplier.
11. The monopolist is a price-taker with respect to the supplier, and the price
p charged by the supplier is known by the monopolist ex ante, i.e., before
the monopolist takes its production decisions.
12. v>p>c
Proposition 7 If assumptions 1 through 12 hold, the quanity produced by the
monopolist is the following:the market is completely served, and the quantity
produced by the monopolist is decreasing with respect to the situation of unavail-
ability of the supplier, and its expected proﬁti si n c r e a s i n g
Proof. The monopolist solves now the following problem:
max
q∗ E (π|q ≤ q∗)Pr(q ≤ q∗)+E (π|q>q ∗)Pr(q>q ∗)=
= E (vq − cq∗|q ≤ q∗)Pr(q ≤ q∗)+E (vq∗ − cq∗ +( v − p)(q − q∗)|q>q ∗)Pr(q>q ∗)=
max














The ﬁrst order conditions are the following:





10The previous results show that the quantity produced is decreasing if the option
of buying it is available.
To check it formally,







As usual, we verify that the second order conditions hold:
∂π
∂q∗ = −q∗v + v − c − v + p + q∗v − q∗p
∂π
∂q∗q∗ = −p<0













As intuitively plausible, the quantity increases with the cost.
Now, let us consider the problem of the selling ﬁrm. The selling ﬁrm sets
prices, in order to maximize proﬁts. If we are willing to assume that risks are
uncorrelated, i.e., that the ﬁrm sells to many local monopolist, so something
similar to the law of large number applies, the energy supplier will be maximiz-
ing its price without aggregate uncertainty, i.e., without dispersion of unused
resources.
max
p Eπ = E (π|π>0)Pr(π>0)
max








From the ﬁrst order condition, we get the solution to the problem, actually
concave:
p =2 c
For the ﬁrm to be willing to produce at this prices, it has to make positive
proﬁt, so p =2 c<v .Otherwise, the constraint p =2 v becomes binding and
the ﬁrm sets p = v.






2 if v > 2c
v−c
v if 2c>v>c
0 if c > v
Now, there are two ﬁrms, both vertically integrated. Each of them still
has the exclusive for serving the consumers in its area, due to the extremely
high costs of duplicating the retail network. However, now, the ﬁrms can trade
energy with each ther, being interconnected. That means that, if one is in excess
supply, and the other is in excess demand, a gainful trade will take place.
Formally, I introduce three new assumptions, bound to replace 10, 11, and
12. They are the following:
13. There are two regional monopolist
14. Each of them can buy some energy from the other, if that energy is avail-
able.Speciﬁcally, as a simplifying assumption, a ﬁrm will buy some energy
if and only if its excess demand is lower than the excess supply of the
other ﬁrm. In other words, ﬁrm i will buy energy from ﬁrm j if and only
if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
• Firm i has underproduced with respect to the demand
• Firm j has overproduced with respect to the demand
• The overproduction of ﬁrm j outweighs the underproduction of ﬁrm i, i.e.,
ﬁrm i serves all of its consumers after buying from ﬁrm j
15. The two regional monopolists simultaneously set prices and quantites
16. Quantities are assumed to be equal for the two ﬁrms, i.e., we are restricting
attention to pure strategy symeetric Bayesian nash equilibria.
Proposition 8 In the game described by assumption 1-6, 7b-9, 13-16, the quan-
tity produced and the price charged in any symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium

















1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)2)Pr(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)+
3)E (π|q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)4)Pr(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)+
5)E (π|q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 > q2 − q∗
2)6)Pr(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 > q2 − q∗
2)+
7)E (π|q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 − q1 > q2 − q∗
2)8)Pr(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 − q1 > q2 − q∗
2)+
9)E (π|q∗
1 < q1,q ∗
2 > q2, q1 − q∗
1 <q ∗
2 − q2)10)Pr(q∗
1 < q1,q ∗




1 < q1,q ∗
2 < q2, q1 − q∗
1 <q ∗
2 − q2)12)Pr(q∗
1 < q1,q ∗




1 < q1,q ∗
2 > q2, q1 − q∗
1 >q ∗
2 − q2)14)Pr(q∗
1 < q1,q ∗




1 < q1,q ∗
2 < q2, q1 − q∗
1 >q ∗
2 − q2)16)Pr(q∗
1 < q1,q ∗
2 < q2, q1 − q∗
1 >q ∗
2 − q2)
Now, we are giving the expressions for the terms in the previous big equation:
1)E (vq1 − cq∗
1)|(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)
3)E (vq1 − cq∗
1)|(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)
5)E (vq1 − cq∗
1)|(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 > q2 − q∗
2)
7)E (vq1 − cq∗
1)+p1




1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗




1)+( v − p2)E (q1 − q∗
1)|(q∗
1 < q1,q ∗












Now, it is clear that
Pr(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)=
=P r( q∗
1 > q1 >q ∗
1 − q2 + q∗
2,q ∗
2 > q2)
=P r( q2 − q∗
2 > 0,q ∗
2 > q2)=0




1 < q1,q ∗




1 < q1 <q ∗




2 − q2 > 0,q ∗
2 < q2)=0
It therefore follows that
12) = 0
13Now, we can go a step further and establish another result. We know that
2) = 0, hence it follows that
Pr( q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 > q2 − q∗
2)=
Pr( q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2)= q∗
1 q∗
2




Analogously, since we know that 12) = 0, it follows that
Pr(q∗
1 < q1,q ∗




1 < q1,q ∗




16) = (1 − q∗
1)(1− q∗
2)
The computation of 6) and 8) becomes slightly more complicated. Basically, we
have to establish Pr(q1 − q∗
1 >q ∗
2 − q2). In order to do that, it is necessary to
remeber that the joint probability of
Pr(q1 + q2 >q ∗
2 + q∗
1)
is given by the triangular distribution.
Now, it is clear that there is not an unique expression that deﬁnes the




2. We need at this point a guess about the value of q∗
1 + q∗
2, solve
the problem assuming the guess is correct, then verify the guess eventually. Our




Looking at the picture, and computing areas (the result can be more for-
mally derived through the standard integration procedure, but this simpliﬁ-
cation helps, maybe, to give more intuition for the result). The result is the
following - note that from now, I’ll always behave as such my guess is correct,
even when this is not clearly stated in the paper.













It then follows that













At this point, it follows that
Pr( q1 + q2 <q ∗
1 + q∗
2|q∗
































1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 − q1 > q2 − q∗
2)=
Pr( q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 + q∗






























































1 (1 − q∗
2)
It also follows that:
Pr( q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)=
=P r(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 + q∗


























































1 < q1,q ∗




1 < q1,q ∗






































































1 < q1,q ∗




1 < q1,q ∗




























2 (1 − q∗
1)


























2 (1 − q∗
1)
Now, we compute
E (vq1 − cq∗
1)|(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗
1 − q1 < q2 − q∗
2)=
E (vq1 − cq∗
1)|(q∗
1 > q1 >q ∗
1 + q∗
2 − q2, q2 >q ∗




1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗





2 − E (q2)
2
E (q2)|(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗









1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗










1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗








F i n a l l y ,w eh a v et h a t
E (vq1 − cq∗
1)|(q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 < q2,q ∗





























Finally, let us compute
E (π|q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗
1 − q1 > q2 − q∗
2)=
E ((vq1 − cq∗
1)|q∗
1 > q1,q ∗
2 > q2,q ∗



















































































































































































16) = (1 − q∗
1)(1− q∗
2)
Now, we are ready to state and solve the maximization problem that each ﬁrm
faces, when it has choose the quantity to produce and the price to charge to the
other ﬁrm, taking the price it is charged by the other ﬁrm, and the quantity
produced by the rival, as given. The two ﬁrms are ex ante equal, and the only
diﬀerence is introduced ex post, when the demand is revealed.







































































































































































To make the previous equation a bit more tractable, assume c =1 . The optimal










The quantity produced in this case is higher than in the case of lack of inter-

















is veriﬁed for all values of v. The previous thread of argument is valid only for
29
17 <v<103
67 , given our assumptions on v and c
183 Version D: interconnection, intermediation, dy-
namic (incomplete)
Now, let us see the ﬁnal case. The two ﬁrms sell their energy to a monopolistic
retailer of energy, that is, an intermediary between the two ﬁrms and the con-
sumer. Suppose that the intermediary does not have to compete with anyone,
i.e., the ﬁrms are selling their products to him. The intermediary takes the risk
of uncertainty over quantity. We have now two possible cases. In the ﬁrst case,
the intermediary takes the whole burden of risk on himself
Formally, there are new assumptions besides 1-6, 7b-9, and they are:
14. There is a monopolistic intermediary to which the two energy ﬁrms sell
their product
15. The intermediary bears the aggregate uncertainty, and maximizes the ex-
pected ask-bid spread
16. In a two stage game, at ﬁrst the intermediary sets a price, as a function
of the demand, and then the two monopolists solve their problem with
certainty
17. The two regional monopolists still behave monopolistically (it would make
more sense to assume they play Cournot with capacity constraints. I’ll do
it later)
















Proof. Now, the intermediary does the following:
maxE (vq∗ − cq∗|q∗ < q)Pr(q∗ < q)+E (vq − cq∗|q∗ > q)Pr(q∗ > q)
Now, as we did previously, we try to solve th previous equation term by term,




















































The monopolists maximize their production knowing the level of demand
by the intermediary, who assumes on himself the whole risk. Therefore, they




































at [w =], supposing the two ﬁrms can collude to a monopoly price.

























In conclusion, the intermediary bears the risk, increases the ﬁrms’ proﬁt,
and
4C o n c l u s i o n
It is obviously better for consumers to be served always, and not to be hit by a
blackout. However, blackouts arise. In the model, and proably in the industry
too, they arise because of uncertainty in demand. Connecting wires can share
the risk. The question that is in my mind, and that I hope this paper will
address when it will be completed, are the following:
1) Will the energy ﬁrms be willing to connect in order to avoid blackouts?
The answer in the paper is yes, but we did not consider the ﬁxed cost of estab-
lishing the connection, very important indeed
2) What is the optimal structure of the market, i.e., what would the outcome
of an unregulated process be? Would this outcome avoid blackouts?
I believe the questions are important, as the energy market is subject to a
lot of regulations that ASSUME to be inspired to a competitive outcome. But
the question is: are we sure the competitive outcome regulators inspire to is the
true competitive outcome?
And more, are we sure that the true competitive outcome wouldn’t be welfare
enhancing also for consumers with respect to the regulation outcome?
5 References
Green, E., Robert H. Porter, "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price
Information", Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Jan., 1984), pp. 87-100
Spulber, D., "Market Microstructure: Intermediaties and the Theory of the
Firm", Cambridge University Press, 1999
20Viscusi, Vernon, Harrington, "Economics of Antitrust and Regulation", MIT
Press 2000
21